I found NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security to be highly interesting as it was written in early on in the Cold War in 1950, when the situation was not as complicated as it during the 1960s through the 1980s. This relative simplicity, in my opinion, of the situation in 1950 was due to the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union were still adjusting, in varying degrees, to the international atmosphere of a post-WWII world, and were both far from reaching their economic and military primacies. Another fact that I see as contributing to 1950 being a less complicated year of the Cold War is although the fission bomb had recently been introduced and the thermonuclear bomb was waiting “in the wings,” so to speak, the pace of military research and design had not yet ramped up and, hence, the multitude of new, technologically-advanced and highly destructive weapons that were to come—such as ICBMs, stealth bombers, nuclear submarines, and MIRVs—had not yet been developed. All of these weapons, and others, caused the complexity of the Cold War to increase dramatically, as they presented new threats and strategies that nations had to counter.
If NSC-68 and the realist perspective were to be taken and held up against one another, the realist perspective would approve of the course of action NSC-68 suggests (that is, the steady and concerted build-up of the political, economic, and military capabilities—and hence the security—of the United States and the free world to face the Soviet threat). The document would also be in harmony with the realist perspective as both hold power and security to be the primary motivation for nations.
However, there are several very unique aspects of this document that I noticed as I was reading through it. Aside from the antiquated language, such as “atomic” and “European NAT countries,” I was highly surprised to find that the tone and recommendations of the document were overwhelmingly reasonable, principled, and considered all aspects of the situation, even in a time when the perceived threat from the Soviet Union to the United States’ way of life was immense. At the beginning of the document is a section called, “Fundamental Purpose of the United States,” and is as follows:
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: “. . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.
Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, “with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”
Such an affirmation of the principles on which the United States was built infers that the conclusions and recommendations offered in NSC-68 will be the manifestation and reinforcement of these principles. It was surprising to see such an affirmation in this markedly realist document, as realists hold power as the main goal of states and that states will pursue power through any means regardless of ideological or other beliefs. Chapter IV, Section C follows this principled theme by discussing the responsibilities regarding the use of force such principles command:
The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.
Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.
The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.
Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.
But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) “The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief.”
The above passages deviate from realist thinking because they present strong ideologically-grounded limitations on the use of force. The phrase, “[t]he free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends,” references the realist philosopher Machiavelli’s classic quote, “the ends justify the means,” but clearly indicates that a free society cannot disregard its principles when pursuing its goals because doing so would cause its “basic principles [to be] obscured and compromised.” The hazards regarding force are also mentioned in Chapter IX, where four courses of action the United States could take regarding the Soviet Union are outlined. In Section C it is stated that war, as a course of action for dealing with the Soviet threat, would be an unacceptable to the United States:
Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of “preventive” war—in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies—is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly…This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong.
It is further stated that such an action “would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow,” and that “…a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive.” These two statements fly in the face of realist thinking by declaring in strong terms that such an action would not only cause harm to countries other than the United States, but that committing such an action would be morally unacceptable for a free society. The sense of obligations to other nations, which realists would frown upon, is also mentioned in Chapter IX. In the analysis of isolationism as a course of action in Section B, it is said that, “[a]s the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies,” highlighting the emphasize NSC-68 placed upon the bonds between the United States and its allies. Lastly, one other interesting piece of Section B was the passage, “…many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.” This statement (and several similar ones throughout NSC-68) was particularly striking as it took into account that actions such as the militarization of American society could be just as great a threat to the fundamental purpose of the United States as was the Soviet Union.
The objectives of the United States outlined in NSC-68 regarding the Soviet Union are also unexpectedly reasonable. The document also did not demonize or stereotype the Soviet people as enemies of the United States, as was often done in talk of the Soviet Union (especially during the Red Scare in the 1950s), but targeted the idea of communism and its manifestation in the governmental institutions and aims of the Soviet Union. Also, rather than calling for the annihilation (in any shape or form) of the Soviet Union, NSC-68 states that pressure needs to be applied so as to “induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world.” Similar statements can be found throughout NSC-68 calling for the Soviet Union to “adjust,” “negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance,” and “[behave] in accordance with precepts of international conduct.” Such language is a very surprising as the atmosphere of the time would seem to indicate a US urge to defeat or destroy the Soviet Union.
Yet another interesting discovery within this markedly realist document was the call for greater international cooperation and the strengthening of the United Nations, which is most noticeable in Chapters VI, VIII, and IX. Chapter VI states that an integral part of the overall US policy regarding the Soviet Union “…is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community.” Such a policy seems to be the exact opposite of what realists—to whom the belief in the anarchic nature of the international system is key—would recommend. Chapter VI further states that this policy “…is the long-term constructive effort which [the United States is] engaged in,” and that “[i]t was this policy which gave rise to [the United States’] vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations.” Considering current national realist sentiments, it is interesting to hear about the United States’ “vigorous sponsorship” of the United Nations in such a positive tone, especially in a document regarding US national security! Chapter VIII, which addresses the issue of atomic weapons, further defines conventional realist thinking by affirming that “it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments,” and speaks of the need for international controls on atomic energy and the impossibility of these controls being established unless a “genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.” The goal of established such an international regulatory agency, or any international regulatory agency for that matter, would be dismissed by realists who hold international organizations to have little, if any, impact in a world dominated by unitary state actors. Finally, in Chapter IX, comes the call to build a cooperative international system:
It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice.
It was this statement that was possibly the most surprising in all of NSC-68. In 1950, a time when the Cold War was heating up, the Red Scare was taking place, and fear of nuclear war between the two superpowers was in everyone’s mind, comes a call for building a cooperative international system based on freedom and justice! Such a statement seems like the absolute last thing a realist would be caught saying in the 1950s (and a US national security document!). Such a statement was surprising then, and it is even more surprising now, considering recent US actions such as the Iraq War.
Looking back on everything here, maybe NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security isn’t such a realist document after all.
-Gregory Proulx
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