Reflections on Week Eight

Week eight was a very exciting week for me. I thoroughly enjoyed reading the two reports on US national security and decided to choose NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security as the document I would focus on while answering question #7. My answer ended up being quite substantial as there were many aspects of NSC-68 that I found interesting, such as calls for an international system "based on freedom and justice" and strong affirmations of the fundamental ideological purpose of the United States. I found it very surprising that a realist document written on such a topic, and at such a tense period in time, would contain such suggestions and affirmations.

Our Wednesday trip to the International Spy Museum was really fun. The cloak-and-dagger world of espionage has always been an interest of mine—I have a large collection of spy books about Cold War espionage at home—so it was very exciting to be able to explore this interest in the context of a class! Although I've been to the museum before, I find that the amount of information available is simply too much to absorb in one (well, now two) days, so I definitely plan on visiting again. Later that day I went with Gunperi to the Capital to see the awarding of the Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama and to hear him speak, which was a wonderful experience. It reminded me of how lucky I am to be going to college in Washington, D.C.—it's not often that you get to hear the Dalai Lama speak in your city!

I also enjoyed reading Carol Cohn's "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" for Friday's class. I thought it was a very interesting article which did a thorough analysis of the issue and raised a lot of good points. Being someone who is fairly literate in the language of nuclear strategy, I was actually quite surprised to hear about the sexual overtones in the language of 1980s defense intellectuals, and personally thought such overtones were highly unprofessional. I also thought the language regarding virginity and birth seemed very strange and out-of-place. I was a bit skeptical of some of Cohn's analysis of the language of defense intellectuals, such as when she mentions how the acronym for Permissive Action Links—PAL—makes such planning easier to do. I would have to disagree, as PAL is simply an acronym! Further, when Cohn talks about Oppenheimer's quoting from the Bhagavad Gita I feel that she over-analyzes, as this quote was meant to illustrate the shock and, possibly, guilt at releasing such a destructive force on the world. Overall, thought, I thought it was a good article.

Looking forward to another good week!

-Gregory Proulx

Principles and Means: The Issue of US National Security during the Cold War

I found NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security to be highly interesting as it was written in early on in the Cold War in 1950, when the situation was not as complicated as it during the 1960s through the 1980s. This relative simplicity, in my opinion, of the situation in 1950 was due to the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union were still adjusting, in varying degrees, to the international atmosphere of a post-WWII world, and were both far from reaching their economic and military primacies. Another fact that I see as contributing to 1950 being a less complicated year of the Cold War is although the fission bomb had recently been introduced and the thermonuclear bomb was waiting “in the wings,” so to speak, the pace of military research and design had not yet ramped up and, hence, the multitude of new, technologically-advanced and highly destructive weapons that were to come—such as ICBMs, stealth bombers, nuclear submarines, and MIRVs—had not yet been developed. All of these weapons, and others, caused the complexity of the Cold War to increase dramatically, as they presented new threats and strategies that nations had to counter.

If NSC-68 and the realist perspective were to be taken and held up against one another, the realist perspective would approve of the course of action NSC-68 suggests (that is, the steady and concerted build-up of the political, economic, and military capabilities—and hence the security—of the United States and the free world to face the Soviet threat). The document would also be in harmony with the realist perspective as both hold power and security to be the primary motivation for nations.

However, there are several very unique aspects of this document that I noticed as I was reading through it. Aside from the antiquated language, such as “atomic” and “European NAT countries,” I was highly surprised to find that the tone and recommendations of the document were overwhelmingly reasonable, principled, and considered all aspects of the situation, even in a time when the perceived threat from the Soviet Union to the United States’ way of life was immense. At the beginning of the document is a section called, “Fundamental Purpose of the United States,” and is as follows:

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: “. . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, “with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”

Such an affirmation of the principles on which the United States was built infers that the conclusions and recommendations offered in NSC-68 will be the manifestation and reinforcement of these principles. It was surprising to see such an affirmation in this markedly realist document, as realists hold power as the main goal of states and that states will pursue power through any means regardless of ideological or other beliefs. Chapter IV, Section C follows this principled theme by discussing the responsibilities regarding the use of force such principles command:

The free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends.

Compulsion is the negation of freedom, except when it is used to enforce the rights common to all. The resort to force, internally or externally, is therefore a last resort for a free society. The act is permissible only when one individual or groups of individuals within it threaten the basic rights of other individuals or when another society seeks to impose its will upon it. The free society cherishes and protects as fundamental the rights of the minority against the will of a majority, because these rights are the inalienable rights of each and every individual.

The resort to force, to compulsion, to the imposition of its will is therefore a difficult and dangerous act for a free society, which is warranted only in the face of even greater dangers. The necessity of the act must be clear and compelling; the act must commend itself to the overwhelming majority as an inescapable exception to the basic idea of freedom; or the regenerative capacity of free men after the act has been performed will be endangered.

Our free society, confronted by a threat to its basic values, naturally will take such action, including the use of military force, as may be required to protect those values. The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design, nor does the necessity for conducting ourselves so as to affirm our values in actions as well as words forbid such measures, provided only they are appropriately calculated to that end and are not so excessive or misdirected as to make us enemies of the people instead of the evil men who have enslaved them.

But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight in which no underlying problems are solved, new ones are created, and where our basic principles are obscured and compromised. If we do not in the application of force demonstrate the nature of our objectives we will, in fact, have compromised from the outset our fundamental purpose. In the words of the Federalist (No. 28) “The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief.”

The above passages deviate from realist thinking because they present strong ideologically-grounded limitations on the use of force. The phrase, “[t]he free society is limited in its choice of means to achieve its ends,” references the realist philosopher Machiavelli’s classic quote, “the ends justify the means,” but clearly indicates that a free society cannot disregard its principles when pursuing its goals because doing so would cause its “basic principles [to be] obscured and compromised.” The hazards regarding force are also mentioned in Chapter IX, where four courses of action the United States could take regarding the Soviet Union are outlined. In Section C it is stated that war, as a course of action for dealing with the Soviet threat, would be an unacceptable to the United States:

Some Americans favor a deliberate decision to go to war against the Soviet Union in the near future. It goes without saying that the idea of “preventive” war—in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies—is generally unacceptable to Americans. Its supporters argue that since the Soviet Union is in fact at war with the free world now and that since the failure of the Soviet Union to use all-out military force is explainable on grounds of expediency, we are at war and should conduct ourselves accordingly…This is a powerful argument in the light of history, but the considerations against war are so compelling that the free world must demonstrate that this argument is wrong.

It is further stated that such an action “would probably mean a long and difficult struggle during which the free institutions of Western Europe and many freedom-loving people would be destroyed and the regenerative capacity of Western Europe dealt a crippling blow,” and that “…a surprise attack upon the Soviet Union, despite the provocativeness of recent Soviet behavior, would be repugnant to many Americans. Although the American people would probably rally in support of the war effort, the shock of responsibility for a surprise attack would be morally corrosive.” These two statements fly in the face of realist thinking by declaring in strong terms that such an action would not only cause harm to countries other than the United States, but that committing such an action would be morally unacceptable for a free society. The sense of obligations to other nations, which realists would frown upon, is also mentioned in Chapter IX. In the analysis of isolationism as a course of action in Section B, it is said that, “[a]s the Soviet Union came to dominate free countries, it is clear that many Americans would feel a deep sense of responsibility and guilt for having abandoned their former friends and allies,” highlighting the emphasize NSC-68 placed upon the bonds between the United States and its allies. Lastly, one other interesting piece of Section B was the passage, “…many would seek to defend the United States by creating a regimented system which would permit the assignment of a tremendous part of our resources to defense. Under such a state of affairs our national morale would be corrupted and the integrity and vitality of our system subverted.” This statement (and several similar ones throughout NSC-68) was particularly striking as it took into account that actions such as the militarization of American society could be just as great a threat to the fundamental purpose of the United States as was the Soviet Union.

The objectives of the United States outlined in NSC-68 regarding the Soviet Union are also unexpectedly reasonable. The document also did not demonize or stereotype the Soviet people as enemies of the United States, as was often done in talk of the Soviet Union (especially during the Red Scare in the 1950s), but targeted the idea of communism and its manifestation in the governmental institutions and aims of the Soviet Union. Also, rather than calling for the annihilation (in any shape or form) of the Soviet Union, NSC-68 states that pressure needs to be applied so as to “induce the Soviet Union to accommodate itself, with or without the conscious abandonment of its design, to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world.” Similar statements can be found throughout NSC-68 calling for the Soviet Union to “adjust,” “negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance,” and “[behave] in accordance with precepts of international conduct.” Such language is a very surprising as the atmosphere of the time would seem to indicate a US urge to defeat or destroy the Soviet Union.

Yet another interesting discovery within this markedly realist document was the call for greater international cooperation and the strengthening of the United Nations, which is most noticeable in Chapters VI, VIII, and IX. Chapter VI states that an integral part of the overall US policy regarding the Soviet Union “…is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community.” Such a policy seems to be the exact opposite of what realists—to whom the belief in the anarchic nature of the international system is key—would recommend. Chapter VI further states that this policy “…is the long-term constructive effort which [the United States is] engaged in,” and that “[i]t was this policy which gave rise to [the United States’] vigorous sponsorship of the United Nations.” Considering current national realist sentiments, it is interesting to hear about the United States’ “vigorous sponsorship” of the United Nations in such a positive tone, especially in a document regarding US national security! Chapter VIII, which addresses the issue of atomic weapons, further defines conventional realist thinking by affirming that “it would be to the long-term advantage of the United States if atomic weapons were to be effectively eliminated from national peacetime armaments,” and speaks of the need for international controls on atomic energy and the impossibility of these controls being established unless a “genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has taken place.” The goal of established such an international regulatory agency, or any international regulatory agency for that matter, would be dismissed by realists who hold international organizations to have little, if any, impact in a world dominated by unitary state actors. Finally, in Chapter IX, comes the call to build a cooperative international system:

It is clear that our long-range objectives require a strengthened United Nations, or a successor organization, to which the world can look for the maintenance of peace and order in a system based on freedom and justice.

It was this statement that was possibly the most surprising in all of NSC-68. In 1950, a time when the Cold War was heating up, the Red Scare was taking place, and fear of nuclear war between the two superpowers was in everyone’s mind, comes a call for building a cooperative international system based on freedom and justice! Such a statement seems like the absolute last thing a realist would be caught saying in the 1950s (and a US national security document!). Such a statement was surprising then, and it is even more surprising now, considering recent US actions such as the Iraq War.

Looking back on everything here, maybe NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security isn’t such a realist document after all.

-Gregory Proulx

Reflections VIII

In discussing the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information, and the need for a more peaceful and politically stable world, many theories come to the table such as multilateral disarmament and a more constructive negotiation strategy and methods to promote and achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. However, because technology, once developed and applied, cannot be reversed and countries like to use nuclear weapons to amplify their “voice” on the world stage in order to increase their political power and economic leverage, there is little hope that nuclear weapons will be eliminated and the struggle for their attainment will cease in the near future. While we should be procuring every possible chance for political and economic stability in the future and be searching for an effective way to communicate and peacefully coexist, all of which will take considerable time and effort, what measures can be taken in the meantime? If other countries do not wish to comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or any other form of disarmament, and nuclear weapons would continue to proliferate into the hands of the dangerous, the US and its allies would remain politically and economically vulnerable at the expense of any peace initiative, which would be doomed from the outset. Yet many convincingly argue that the widespread possession of nuclear weapons would be a deterrent and, as such, be comparable to a lack thereof, as a country would be afraid to make the first move to support a threat with the use of a nuclear weapon, as it would in effect result in self destruction when the inevitable retaliating strike is made. This theory is based on the human survival instinct and the fear of death. However, with increasingly bold and aggressive religious extremism, the deterrent factor might not be applicable, as it only takes one “martyr” without this instinctive fear of death and placed in a politically powerful position with access to nuclear weaponry to possibly annihilate millions. Therefore, if nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated or effectively controlled, as by nature, their sheer existence allows for dangerous hands and minds to work under the security radar and attain or develop such weapons, regardless of the decisions made by dominant countries, we must find ways to handle their presence for the future and ensure our safety. The most peaceful solution might be to have widespread, balanced, and treaty-controlled possession of nuclear weapons, while finding other ways and means to exert force on others and building new technology to maintain importance in the world market.

reflections

On Wednesday we took a trip to the International Spy Museum. While this was certainly very cool and informative, for me the real highlight of the day was seeing the Dalai Lama speak. It's not every day that you get a chance to see one of the world's great religious leaders and Nobel Peace prize winners address such a large and diverse crowd. To be honest I did not know much about the problem in Tibet before this past week, just the bare bones of the issue. However, after watching a film on the conflict for one of my classes, reading up and going to see the Dalai Lama, I realize just how big of an issue it really is. Unfortunately we seem to have a very short attention span, not just here, but throughout the globe. It was not that long ago that Tibet was a huge issue, but now we have all but forgotten. This past Monday my professor for Views from the third World asked who thought they had a real grasp on the situation and only a couple seniors raised their hands, they were the only ones old enough to remember when it was actually on the news, when we actually cared. Something the Dalai Lama said struck me, he said that United States support of Tibet had been unwavering. He said this even though we removed all support in favor of stronger economic ties with China, even though we are funding their suffering through the grape vine. Maybe when he looks at the United States he sees more than just the fickle support received from our government, maybe he sees the individuals that keep the struggles and hardships of the Tibetan people in mind even when our government and media seem to have stopped caring. Not every American has to have a short attention span. Darfur was on the news constantly not that long ago, but now coverage is a lot more sparse. The same goes for every huge global humanitarian issue. We care for awhile, forget, hear about it again and think that the problem has returned when really it never stopped.
Even with the fickleness of the media and government towards these issues it was reassuring to see that the US did not cave into China's wish for us to cancel the event. Though the repercussions will be slim to none even with things carried out as planned it is at least a comfort to know that we cannot be that easily made to go back on our word. Perhaps that can serve as a sign that their may still be hope for the good reputation and honest word of the US government in the future.

Discussion

Here is a summary of the discussion on Friday that Professor Jackson asked me to post. If you have anything you want to add or correct please do so.

Greg: weapons are useless and irrational for a democracy
Rebecca: Not completely irrational because you have to continue to have weapons
Autumn: nuclear strategic people are rational to have because you have to defend against possible attack. Look at possible events that could happen- based on what if
Titus: not rational to have the amount we have – article’s point is that community is structured and limited to language they use, isolated group talking about issues- few individuals
Rachel: nuclear warfare is not likely so only a few people use the language. Language is necessary for dealing with issue
Ian: have to realize what you are doing. Need to focus on death that occurs.
Sarah: language doesn’t need to change- subject is the missiles- way of thinking that needs to be changed
Caitlin: the language is transformative, not additive
Supriya: language is practical, efficient- they are doing the mechanics
Travis: author is paranoid- trying to be rational- abstract topic
Lauren L.: job needs to be less technical- they dehumanize what they are discussing and letting subject be missiles- the language should be less abstract
Megan: hard to be utilitarian when you consider people you will be hurting- easier to decide if you don’t consider them
Stephan: they aren’t totally oblivious to the human aspects
Ashley: should think about moral/ethical problems- they are in a game world
Tom: point is to try to win nuclear war- hard to think about situation when it is occurring- feminism applies to everything without masculinity
Lauren S.: jargon is not positive, people discussing it are men
Claire: men are involved because of male dominance of other- jargon is necessary to understand and humanize actions
Emily: jargon is not helpful- easier for men to get into field because of the terms used, men and women can’t relate under those terms
James: jargon is useful because they can understand what they are talking about- it is used to simplify
Gunperi: jargon shouldn’t be used because of moral ethical aspects- trying to ease minds to what they are doing
Sam: jargon is good- people wouldn’t understand technical, military terms- so they use the jargon- author takes language out of context
Erica: at first she didn’t understand-she had to become accustomed to the language to conform. Many phrases taken out of context- no purposeful intent to exclude women, just evolved.

Megan: bureaucracy inhibits discussion of peaceful aspects
Sarah: other people have job to talk about peace and there can’t be dialogue because they have different language
Megan: not fault of war people that peace people don’t have jargon
Titus: do we want discussion be about missiles, or actually prove we are acting for greater good- language has negative effect on policy
Rachel: language is defense mechanism because they still have to realize consequences, useful to help them have conversations about it without “freaking out”
Ashley: language makes it easier to push the button
Gunperi: leaders put defense people into position, leaders are forcing people to do this
Titus: structure and ideology not language is most important- people looking at it scientifically has effect on policy makers- if we changed the way defense people thought, we would change policy
Lauren L.: Cat’s Cradle- person doesn’t care what research leads to- destroys universe
Megan: technological development doesn’t initially have negative intentions but rather positive intentions
Greg: technology (nuclear weapons) invalidate previous technological innovation
Titus: bombs have greater reach than internet- people should care more about people than bombs
Caitlin- we still need nuclear weapons to counter the weapons of others
Nate- strategic planners are only ones talking about this- there is a dual voice since President (civilian) has ultimate say
Titus: if we didn’t have such threatening capabilities other countries wouldn’t need weapons- should make deals with countries to limit total weapons
Tom: mathematical models govern thinking about other side’s intentions – USSR had phallic language as well
Ashley: if both exchange nuclear weapons total annihilation so that’s not wise- we tell other countries to get rid of weapons but we have the most
Stephan: when there are huge stockpiles countries won’t use them because they will get bombed by an opposing force
Titus: do we want to live under fear of other nations all the time? If you have a gun you are more likely to use it even if everyone has one
Autumn: can’t get rid of technology because someone would rebuild it- if we tried to get rid of weapons someone else would recognize vulnerability and attack us
James: others won’t destroy weapons just because we do
Caitlin- weapons give countries a voice

Reflection Week 8

Tuesday we discussed national security documents. I thought it was very interesting how eerily similar the two documents were despite the fact that they were separated by half a century and many changes in world politics. The two documents were very similar even though they seemed to be going after two different enemies. The methods used against these enemies were similar revealing how little the tools of American foreign policy have changed in half a century. In terms of the structure of the discussion I liked it more than our large group discussions. We were able to discuss the issues more in-depth with fewer people and everyone was able to speak more and subsequently we could have more of a conversation. With such small groups you could have a conversation in which each person would have multiple chances to talk rather than just one and therefore I think we were less afraid that we had to say everything we wanted to all at once. We worked together to come up with an answer we all agreed upon rather than fighting with one another as to who was right which provided a nice change of pace.
As far as the Spy Museum goes, I think the whole premise of the museum is more interesting than the museum itself was. Megan pointed this out to me when she said that it was interesting in a free society we had a museum devoted to our spying. The whole purpose of spying is to be secretive and often to hide that you are spying at all and yet there is a museum dedicated to how spying is done which clearly reveals that we have spies. I guess the cat is out of the bag now since everyone knows that all countries have spies. Nevertheless it is still interesting that information about the tools of spying are displayed in such a public way. Anyone could walk in there and learn about spy techniques. Certainly many details have been left out but still this means the United States must be very confident that its spying endeavors will not be compromised by the information presented. However it still strikes me as odd that we have such a museum but maybe that’s just me.
Erica Peterson

Hierarchy of Security

Considering the National Security Strategy of the USA’s implications for the post 9/11 world and the structure of the War on Terror, realism might be the first theoretical perspective that would come to mind, in a sense that the attainment of homeland security is of top priority and must be dealt with urgently and pragmatically. The attainment of security for the homeland and the control and stabilization of countries suspected of supporting and harboring terrorist organizations are the primary goals of the tactical guidelines to be implemented. The spread and support of the American ideals of democracy and freedom are reiterated as of foremost importance to stabilizing a particularly thorny area while, at the same time, ensuring US security from such an unconventional, idealistic, and religiously radical enemy. However, after the first levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are attained and immediate danger on one’s own soil is controlled, for example, the source and maintenance of a country’s competence and income centers on the table. In the case of the US, and liberally speaking, free trade, political and economic agreements, and a stable world market between “rational” and democratic nations leads to its prosperity as well as the prosperity of others. Therefore, security, when viewed in the long run, means a need to ensure a stable growth pattern and an upward path of achievement for both oneself, and others, as others need to be stable and involved in the market in order for all to benefit. The US is self-interested in its pursuit of negotiation and agreements with other democratic nations, yet this free trade, personal freedom, and some level of democracy would also be beneficial to the development of areas in the grip of radicalism. After all, autocracy robs people of motivation to take responsibility for themselves and creates an environment where they feel out of control, which creates fertile ground for radicalism. Constructively, the USA has learned from the experiences of 9/11 and has changed its approach to the outside world by developing the National Security Strategy, as parts of the world no longer act according to its expectation. The failures in Iraq after the initial military action, for example, forces the USA to learn from them and adjust its security strategy, in cooperation with its allies and, in the case of Iraq, with the Iraqi government as well.