Deadly Legacy: The Soviet Union’s Ravaging of the Environment

The Russian Federation faces a variety of societal problems. Government corruption and suppression of democracy are rife, and human rights violations abound. The Russian military faces numerous operational challenges, including low morale and budgetary problems. Issues regarding Chechnya and terrorism continue to plague the government. Crime and drug use are on the rise, and the population is declining at an alarming rate. Such issues are well-known, often making their way into the public’s eye via the Washington Post or BBC news.

However, one, lesser-known but equally serious issues it that of Russia’s ecological malaise.

The environmental legacy of the Soviet Union is one of mind-boggling disregard and destruction. Soviet industries operated unhindered by environmental regulations which, although stringent, were seldom enforced, releasing massive amounts of pollution into the air, land, and water. In fact, the former Soviet Union is home to some of the world’s most polluted places. The Blacksmith Institute, an environmental organization dealing with pollution problems, ranked Sumgayit in Azerbaijan, Dzerzhinsk and Norilsk in the Russian Federation, and Chernobyl in Ukraine among the top 10 in its annual report, “The World’s Worst Polluted Places: The Top Ten of the Dirty Thirty” (The World’s Worst Polluted Places 6). Of the further twenty locations, six are located in the former Soviet Union. Pollutants at these sites include heavy metals, chemicals and toxic byproducts, harmful particulate, and radioactive materials, which have resulted in increased mortality rates and a myriad of health problems, such as cancer, genetic defects, and respiratory diseases. Still worse is the fact that many sites like these exist across the country. However, industry was not the only source of pollution—agriculture was also to blame. Poor farming practices resulted in major erosion, and the improper use of pesticides—tons of which lie abandoned across the country—contributed to contamination of the soil and water.

The Soviet armed forces also contributed significantly to the destruction of the environment, regularly dumping old munitions, jet fuel, and other hazardous wastes without regard for the health of the environment or citizenry. Clandestine dumping of chemical weapons was widespread, and took place at locations such as the pine forests of Leonidovka and the Baltic Sea. Lev Fedorov, activist and president of the Union of Chemical Safety, estimates that the Soviet military dumped half a million tons of chemical weapons between the end of WWII and the late 1980s, tens of thousands of tons of which still sit buried in “unmarked and still undisclosed graveyards” throughout the former Soviet Union (Hoffman). Military facilities with huge stores of deadly chemical weapons slated for destruction also dot the country, such as those at Gornyy, Maradykovsky, and Shchuchye (“SGP Issue Brief”). The Soviet Navy had the particularly appalling practice of nuclear disposal at sea, dumping large quantities of radioactive waste and submarine reactors with spent fuel into the Barents and Kara Seas, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and the North Pacific Ocean (Steinhardt et al 9-11). Many decommissioned Soviet nuclear submarines sit rusting in port and awaiting dismantlement, adding to the threat of further contamination or accidents. Norway has raised concerns about accidents at Andreyeva Bay, a storage facility for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel of the Russian Northern Fleet located 45 kilometers from the Russian-Norwegian border and 100 kilometers from Murmansk, and the Bellona Foundation has labeled Andreyeva “a ticking time bomb” after research confirmed the possibility of an uncontrollable chain reaction, and small nuclear explosion, at the facility (Alimov). Radiological pollution at Russian nuclear weapons facilities was and continues to be endemic, as highlighted in a publication by the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security:

“Three of Russia’s nuclear materials production sites, referred to historically as Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26, have accounted for over 95 percent of the world’s radioactive waste released to surface and subsurface water systems” (qtd. in Fuller and Leek).

Unsound operating practices and accidents have plagued these facilities, further adding to the threat they pose to the environment and the local population. One of the most serious accidents occurred at Chelyabinsk-65, home to the Mayak Chemical Combine, in 1957 when a radioactive waste storage tank exploded, contaminating some 20,000 square kilometers of land and exposing over 272,000 people to radioactive fallout (Kudrik et al 66-69). This accident, as well as numerous others, has earned Chelyabinsk-65 the infamous reputation of being the most radioactively polluted spot on the planet. Another accident at Tomsk-7 in 1993 resulted in the contamination of 100 square kilometers of land (Kudrik et al 78). Various other sources of radioactive pollution, such as the approximately 1,000 radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) built to power remote navigation beacons and lighthouses, remain scattered throughout the former Soviet Union, posing lingering health and environmental risks.

Unfortunately, this trend of criminal disregard for environmental protection and human health still continues to a large degree. Many of Russia’s industries continue to function as they did in Soviet times, unfettered by environmental regulations which remain inadequate or unenforced. A recent plan was hatched by Minatom, Russia’s nuclear ministry, to receive foreign shipments of nuclear waste at Chelyabinsk-65 in an attempt to raise much-needed funds; however, this plan was condemned in 2002 by Gosatomnadzor, the ministry’s own nuclear regulator (“Russian Regulators Condemn Own Ministry”). Russia’s pristine forests are facing the threat of increased logging, and the accelerated extraction of natural resources, such as oil and gas at the Sakhalin I and II projects, risks further environmental destruction.

With all this in mind, a prudent question to ask is what is being done about these issues? Many NGOs, such as Greenpeace Russia, the Blacksmith Institute, and the Bellona Foundation, are working towards remediating the ecological devastation of Soviet times. Governments and international organizations, including the United States, Norway, the World Bank, and the European Union, are also helping the Russian Federation by providing environmental assistance in the form of funding and joint cleanup programs. However, many challenges still remain. The Soviet government’s tradition of hostility towards the environmental movement continues to this day, with activists often facing harassment, beatings, and arrest at the hands of Russian authorities. Many are suspicious of government involvement in the beating death of a Siberian anti-nuclear protestor in July 2007 (Kopeikina). Years of Soviet rule also bred indifference towards the well-being of the environment, a trend persistent in many of the former Soviet republics. It is important that the international community continue and expand efforts to deal with the ecological damage caused by the Soviet Union, as well as work to foster environmental consciousness. Such efforts will benefit not only the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics, but the greater global community by preventing further environmental tragedies like those at Mayak and Chernobyl and building a better, cleaner future for the next generation.

-Gregory Proulx

Works Cited

Alimov, Rashid. “Andreyeva Bay is a Ticking Bomb, Bellona’s Documents Prove.” Bellona Foundation. Trans. Maria Kaminskaya. 7 June 2007. 15 Nov. 2007 <http://www.bellona.org/articles/andreyeva_ticking_bomb>.

Fuller, James L., and K. M. Leek. United States. Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security. Department of Energy. Debt for Ecology: a Concept to Help Stabilize Russian Nuclear Cities. 2001. 11 Nov. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/labs/debt_ecology.pdf>.

Hoffman, David. “Wastes of War: Russia’s Forgotten Chemical Weapons.” Washington Post 16 Aug. 1998. 13 Nov. 2007 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/leonidovkaa.htm>.

Kopeikina, Victoria. “Investigators Seek to Frame Environmentalists in Attack on Siberian Ecological Protest Camp.” Bellona Foundation. Trans. Maria Kaminskaya. 8 Aug. 2007. 14 Nov. 2007 <http://www.bellona.org/articles/angarsk_attack>.

Kudrik, Igor, Charles Digges, Alexander Nikitin, Nils Bøhmer, Vladimir Kuznetsov, and Vladislav Larin. The Russian Nuclear Industry: The Need for Reform. Bellona Foundation, 2004. 14 Nov. 2007 <http://www.bellona.org/filearchive/fil_Bellona_2004_RedReport.pdf>.

“Russian Regulators Condemn Own Ministry Over Nuclear Dump Plans.” Greenpeace International. 21 June 2002. 12 Nov. 2007 <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/news/russian-nuclear-dump-plan-cond>.

“SGP Issue Brief: Implementing Chemical Weapons Destruction in Russia.” Strengthening the Global Partnership. Center for Strategic and International Studies. 15 Nov. 2007 <http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/SGPIssueBrief/Annex%201.PDF>.

Steinhardt, Bernice et al. United States. Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division. Government Accountability Office. Nuclear Safety: Concerns with Nuclear Facilities and Other Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union. Nov. 1995. 11 Nov. 2007 <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/rc96004.pdf>.

The World’s Worst Polluted Places: The Top Ten of the Dirty Thirty. New York: The Blacksmith Institute, 2007. 9 Nov. 2007 <http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/wwpp2007/finalReport2007.pdf>.

The Cold War Might Be Over, but the Threat Posed by Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Isn’t

Spanning over 17 million square kilometers, the Russian Federation is the largest country in the world. It is a beautiful country with rolling tundra, great birch forests, and breathtaking pink sunsets that slowly melt away into crisp, clear nights (remembering back to watching one such sunset from a windowsill in St. Petersburg, I realize that written descriptions don’t do such a sight justice). It is a nation with a rich culture, vast natural resources, and a patchwork of ethnic groups. It is a nation with a lengthy and detailed history that spans many centuries.

The Russian Federation is also a nation with a dangerous nuclear legacy.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation and the United States have greatly reduced their nuclear stockpiles, owing both to nonproliferation treaties and the decreased threat of nuclear war. However, a serious threat still exists: the overwhelmingly large number of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons left in the Russian arsenal. Tactical nuclear weapons—also known as TNWs—are designed for use in the battlefield to strike targets ranging from carrier groups to enemy ground forces. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR maintained a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons for use in the event of a conflict with NATO, and this arsenal inherited by the Russian Federation is still frightening large, as highlighted by the Center for Defense Information:

“Russia is currently estimated to have about 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads plus 3,400 tactical nuclear weapons. It should be noted, however, that estimates of Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal vary widely, ranging upwards to 10,000-15,000 when estimates include weapons waiting dismantlement” (Friedman).

Looking at this statistic, some may ask, why is this large number of tactical nuclear weapons so frightening? Aren’t strategic nuclear weapons just as dangerous as tactical ones? Well, yes and no. If strategic nuclear weapons were ever used in warfare, the resulting destruction would be immense, of course. However, as counterintuitive as it may seem, there are several reasons why strategic nuclear weapons are not as dangerous as TNWs. First off, strategic nuclear weapons tend to be mounted on missiles in silos and on submarines, making them difficult to steal, but easy to account for and secure. Strategic weapons also feature intricate security systems that require multiple levels of authorization before they can be armed and deployed. Tactical nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are just the opposite:

“Because of their often small size and portability, tactical nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than strategic nuclear weapons to accidental or illicit use. Characteristics of command unique to some TNWs—such as predelegated launch authorization, and often inadequate safeguards (i.e., effective permissive action links, or PALs) add to their potential unauthorized, accidental, or illicit use” (Alexander and Millar 4).

The small size of TNWs also makes them extremely vulnerable to theft. This, combined with the fact that many of these weapons sit in poorly secured locations throughout the Russian Federation—which are, in turn, guarded by underpaid and demoralized security forces—make Russian tactical nuclear weapons tempting targets for terrorists, who could acquire them either by theft or bribing corrupt security forces. And this isn’t just a hypothetical threat: senior Russian officials have confirmed that “terrorists have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage facilities” (Bunn).

Tactical nuclear weapons come in several different types—from missile warheads that would fit into a truck to artillery shells that could fit into something as small as a backpack or suitcase—and have varying degrees of destructive power. Yields range from “relatively low—0.1 kiloton (KT)—to yields higher than those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—10 to 15 KT, and upwards to 1 megaton” (Alexander and Millar 2). Regardless of this, a terrorist attack on a US city with a stolen Russian tactical nuclear weapon would be devastating. US government analytical tools estimated that the detonation of a 12.5 kiloton bomb—smaller than the Hiroshima bomb—smuggled into New York City would result in 52,000 immediate deaths, expose 238,000 people to direction radiation—causing an additional 10,000 deaths and acute radiation sickness for 44,000 people—and expose 1.5 million people to radioactive fallout in the following days which, in the absence of evacuation or shelter, could kill an additional 200,000 people and cause acute radiation sickness for hundreds of thousands. Another estimate by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2005 predicted that 205,000 fatalities, 295,000 injuries, and 49,000 cancer cases would result from a 10 kiloton explosion in Washington, D.C. (Ruff 6). In addition to the huge number of casualties caused by such an attack, the economic, military, environmental, and political ramifications would be grave and far-reaching.

With these dangers posed by Russia’s vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in mind, a logical question that would come to mind is, “What is being done to reduce this threat?” Unfortunately, not enough, as “[t]actical nuclear weapons are not covered by any arms control pact, such as the [recent US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in 2002], nor are they the subject of any negotiations” (Wurst). Even more worrisome is the renewed Russian interest in TNWs—an interest that is “broad-based and cuts across the entire political spectrum” (Potter 3). Hence, it is imperative for the United States to work towards reducing the TNW threat. The United States should expand the original objectives of the Nun-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement to include the securing and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, as recommended by experts like William Potter, and developing a new arms control treaty that deals with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (Wurst). Increased US-Russian dialogue on, and transparency regarding, tactical nuclear stockpiles is also imperative for progress. By taking steps such as these, the United States and the Russian Federation can work towards reducing the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons.

-Gregory Proulx

Works Cited

Bunn, Matthew. “The Threat in Russia and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/russia.asp>.

Friedman, Benjamin, comp. “The World’s Nuclear Arsenals.” Center for Defense Information. 24 Sept. 2007 <http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#Russia>.

Millar, Alistair, and Brian Alexander. Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2001. 2-4. 2 Oct. 2007 <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/uncoveredrpt.pdf>.

Potter, Professor William C. Mounting Challenges to Nuclear Nonproliferation. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2004. 3. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://disarmament.un.org/rcpd/Sapporo2004/textweb/potterreport.pdf>.

Ruff, Tilman. Nuclear Terrorism. 2006. 6. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://energyscience.org.au/FS10%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf>.

Wurst, Jim. “U.S.-Russia II: Take Care of Tactical Weapons Next, U.N. Report Urges.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 29 May 2002. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/5/29/7s.html>.