Webster’s Dictionary defines marginalize as “to exclude, to ignore” and if we are operating under this definition it is never neither justified nor practical to marginalize others despite differences. More than being immoral to ignore the voice of a group you happen to disagree with, it is unwise because if you ignore them that just gives them the time and space needed to attack you.
When discussing a measure that affects many people it is critical to take into consideration the views of those affected by the measure. As Enloe states NAFTA was agreed to without consideration of the Indian farmers of Mexico and the act harmed them considerably because they were not involved in the negotiations. These people clearly had an interest in the legislation that was being discussed because it directly affected their daily lives and yet they were excluded from the negotiations and therefore marginalized. Furthermore on the domestic side the Native Americans were marginalized in the United States as the American government did not consult them before taking their land and forcing them onto reservations. The health and wellbeing of the Native American population has been severely affected and the United States has lost much moral credibility in the world as a result. Especially in this circumstance not only the marginalized are adversely affected but also those who do the marginalizing.
The United States cannot simply ignore its enemies or else it would be in grave trouble from the security threat those nations or groups might pose. If the United States ceased negotiations with Iran or North Korea that would give them a good incentive to continue developing their nuclear programs. While the negotiations are not halting these programs at the current time they are attempting to keep them from becoming even more dangerous. If the United States were simply to ignore these countries they would even more so be allowed to continue their programs, which clearly pose a threat to the United States. We must seek the input of even those with whom we disagree if we are ever going to resolve differences without war. This does not mean that we must always do what are enemies what us to do for that would often be immoral and unwise but it does mean that we should at least know their perspective on the issue so that we can add credibility to our argument and enhance our decision making abilities.
Erica Peterson
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Friday, October 12, 2007
reflection week 7
I thought our trip to the EU Commission this week was very interesting not only for the content of the briefing but mostly for the structure of it. The speaker was very careful about the words he chose to use and how he spoke on certain issues and to certain people. As a typical politician he did not answer some of the questions but rather skirted around the issue and then admitted that he did not really answer the question. This was particularly true when it came to the question about why the integration of the EU economically was easier than militarily. To a certain extent the speaker could profess ignorance about the military aspects because he specializes in trade, but considering the EU is a political organization one would assume that he would have some knowledge of the political and military aspects of the organization. I think he may have avoided the question because he did not know or perhaps because he did not want to reveal the real reason that the EU was unable to organize militarily.
He did touch upon the issue some, however, and said that each nation wants to maintain its own military power and is reluctant to trust others when it comes to security. While I think this is in some ways valid in explaining why nations are less likely to agree on military matters than on economic matters, I cannot help thinking of NATO as a counter argument. While NATO is not a complete military integration it is a military agreement and I wonder why Europe could not have established a similar organization. I recognize that some of the EU nations are also in NATO but there could be a way for them to cooperate with other European nations. The speaker was even less reluctant to offer much information about the issue of expansion of the EU which reveals how politically charged that issue is.
Furthermore he was careful about choosing the right words when he was talking to Gunperi because he did not know whether she was from North or South Cyprus. Unfortunately politics always creates such a position in which to refrain from offending one group you almost have to offend another group unless you are extremely careful about what you say. Wouldn’t it be nice if he could discuss the issue without distinguishing between what he would say to a North Cypriot versus a South Cypriot. I certain do not claim to know everything about this issue but I think we should be able to communicate with each other similarly regardless of where we happen to be from though unfortunately this will be the case as long as there is conflict in the world.
Erica Peterson
He did touch upon the issue some, however, and said that each nation wants to maintain its own military power and is reluctant to trust others when it comes to security. While I think this is in some ways valid in explaining why nations are less likely to agree on military matters than on economic matters, I cannot help thinking of NATO as a counter argument. While NATO is not a complete military integration it is a military agreement and I wonder why Europe could not have established a similar organization. I recognize that some of the EU nations are also in NATO but there could be a way for them to cooperate with other European nations. The speaker was even less reluctant to offer much information about the issue of expansion of the EU which reveals how politically charged that issue is.
Furthermore he was careful about choosing the right words when he was talking to Gunperi because he did not know whether she was from North or South Cyprus. Unfortunately politics always creates such a position in which to refrain from offending one group you almost have to offend another group unless you are extremely careful about what you say. Wouldn’t it be nice if he could discuss the issue without distinguishing between what he would say to a North Cypriot versus a South Cypriot. I certain do not claim to know everything about this issue but I think we should be able to communicate with each other similarly regardless of where we happen to be from though unfortunately this will be the case as long as there is conflict in the world.
Erica Peterson
Monday, October 8, 2007
Reflections on Weeks Four, Five, and Six
Whoo...well, I have a lot to talk about.
I thought our question for week four, wealth vs. security, was a difficult one to answer. To me, it seems that to have one, you must have the other. You cannot be wealthy but have no security, but you cannot have security without wealth. For example, nations such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have great economic potential, but due to instability, are preventing from reaching this potential. On the other hand, if a wealthy nation, such as Saudi Arabia with its vast petroleum resources, did not have security, it would be pretty likely that a neighboring state would come in and take over. Hence, you must have a balance between wealth and security.
Week five was definitely an exciting week. Our discussion on what would be humanity’s response to aliens landing on the White House lawn gave me quite a few ideas for possible scenarios. I’ve actually thought about this topic before, especially after watching movies such as Independence Day, and what would happen if aliens did come to Earth. The conclusion I have often reached is that they would take one look at humans, utter, “What a pathetic, factional, warlike species,” and promptly eradicate us. In most of the movies I have seen involving aliens, they are always intellectually superior to humans, and most often come close to wiping humanity out. Fortunately for us, we end up putting aside our differences and banding together to defeat the alien threat. I can only hope we’d do that if we were faced with the threat in real life!
Several other highlights of week five were our visit to the State Department and our discussion on citizenship and what it means to be “American.” The State Department visit was very interesting, and I really enjoyed listening to what Gregg Sullivan had to say about US diplomacy in South and Central Asia. I found it very interested to hear about South and Central Asia, a region which the US has tended to ignore in the past, and all the potential that the region has. I felt that a few times he pushed the “official policy” line a bit too strongly, but overall I was very impressed with his presentation. Our discussion on what it means to be “American” was also very enlightening, for it raised the question of American identity and how it relates to ethnic and cultural background, national heritage, and so on. The questions on the current citizenship test, and the goal of those questions, raises a handful of good questions as well, such as: what values are we trying to instill in immigrants to the US? Should we focus more on what the country was founded on, or how it operates today? Should questions about the current political situation be included, or would that lead to partisan bickering?
And finally week six. I feel that the simulation went well (albeit with some editing errors) and that we got to see an in-depth view of the two sides involved in the battle over domestic content rules: those in favor of domestic content rules (such as GM, Ford, UAW) and those against domestic content rules (consumers, the Sierra Club, AIAM). One of the things I found most interesting was that even though AIAM, the Sierra Club, and consumers are against domestic content rules, the final decision was to keep them in place. This obvious disconnect between what the majority wants (consumers), as well as what would be good for the environment, and the domestic auto manufacturers illustrates the negative impact corporate campaign contributions have on our democracy.
Possibly my favorite thing about week six was the Sunday discussion on Iran. Iran’s saber-rattling and continued nuclear program are two major issues occupying political discussion today. I feel that a great deal of Ahmadinejad’s talk is simply bluster, but the Iranian nuclear program is a definite threat. The United States has seriously inhibited itself from dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat by embroiling ourselves in Iraq. With have little political or diplomatic credibility, and any military action against Iran would destabilize the entire Middle East and destroy whatever credibility we have left. Even if it did become absolutely necessary to strike Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to prevent the imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons, many of Iran’s nuclear facilities are buried deep underground, negating the option of surgical airstrikes with smart munitions such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) or GBU-28 “bunker busters,” the two prime guided munitions in the US arsenal. Also, unlike the Iraqi military, which was never to recover from its near-complete obliteration by US air power during the 1991 Gulf War, Iran has been steadily building up its military, unmolested, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, obtaining advanced military hardware such as the Tor-M1 and S-300 air defense systems and highly-capable Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines from the Russian Federation, making any sort of military action further complicated. Rumors have been swirling about possible US plans to employ tactical low-yield nuclear weapons against Iranian nuclear facilities, but this would be an unthinkable option with disastrous domestic and international consequences. Iran might be saber-rattling now, but they could pose a more serious threat in the future. Still, the United States should not do anything rash, such as attacking Iran—we can’t afford any more mistakes.
In fact, we might even be able to take a lesson from Iran: saber-rattling doesn’t solve anything.
-Gregory Proulx
Sunday, October 7, 2007
The Cold War Might Be Over, but the Threat Posed by Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons Isn’t
Spanning over 17 million square kilometers, the Russian Federation is the largest country in the world. It is a beautiful country with rolling tundra, great birch forests, and breathtaking pink sunsets that slowly melt away into crisp, clear nights (remembering back to watching one such sunset from a windowsill in St. Petersburg, I realize that written descriptions don’t do such a sight justice). It is a nation with a rich culture, vast natural resources, and a patchwork of ethnic groups. It is a nation with a lengthy and detailed history that spans many centuries.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation and the United States have greatly reduced their nuclear stockpiles, owing both to nonproliferation treaties and the decreased threat of nuclear war. However, a serious threat still exists: the overwhelmingly large number of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons left in the Russian arsenal. Tactical nuclear weapons—also known as TNWs—are designed for use in the battlefield to strike targets ranging from carrier groups to enemy ground forces. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR maintained a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons for use in the event of a conflict with NATO, and this arsenal inherited by the Russian Federation is still frightening large, as highlighted by the Center for Defense Information:
“Russia is currently estimated to have about 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads plus 3,400 tactical nuclear weapons. It should be noted, however, that estimates of Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal vary widely, ranging upwards to 10,000-15,000 when estimates include weapons waiting dismantlement” (Friedman).
“Because of their often small size and portability, tactical nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than strategic nuclear weapons to accidental or illicit use. Characteristics of command unique to some TNWs—such as predelegated launch authorization, and often inadequate safeguards (i.e., effective permissive action links, or PALs) add to their potential unauthorized, accidental, or illicit use” (Alexander and Millar 4).
The small size of TNWs also makes them extremely vulnerable to theft. This, combined with the fact that many of these weapons sit in poorly secured locations throughout the Russian Federation—which are, in turn, guarded by underpaid and demoralized security forces—make Russian tactical nuclear weapons tempting targets for terrorists, who could acquire them either by theft or bribing corrupt security forces. And this isn’t just a hypothetical threat: senior Russian officials have confirmed that “terrorists have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage facilities” (Bunn).
Tactical nuclear weapons come in several different types—from missile
warheads that would fit into a truck to artillery shells that could fit into something as small as a backpack or suitcase—and have varying degrees of destructive power. Yields range from “relatively low—0.1 kiloton (KT)—to yields higher than those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—10 to 15 KT, and upwards to 1 megaton” (Alexander and Millar 2). Regardless of this, a terrorist attack on a US city with a stolen Russian tactical nuclear weapon would be devastating. US government analytical tools estimated that the detonation of a 12.5 kiloton bomb—smaller than the Hiroshima bomb—smuggled into New York City would result in 52,000 immediate deaths, expose 238,000 people to direction radiation—causing an additional 10,000 deaths and acute radiation sickness for 44,000 people—and expose 1.5 million people to radioactive fallout in the following days which, in the absence of evacuation or shelter, could kill an additional 200,000 people and cause acute radiation sickness for hundreds of thousands. Another estimate by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2005 predicted that 205,000 fatalities, 295,000 injuries, and 49,000 cancer cases would result from a 10 kiloton explosion in Washington, D.C. (Ruff 6). In addition to the huge number of casualties caused by such an attack, the economic, military, environmental, and political ramifications would be grave and far-reaching.
With these dangers posed by Russia’s vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in mind, a logical question that would come to mind is, “What is being done to reduce this threat?” Unfortunately, not enough, as “[t]actical nuclear weapons are not covered by any arms control pact, such as the [recent US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in 2002], nor are they the subject of any negotiations” (Wurst). Even more worrisome is the renewed Russian interest in TNWs—an interest that is “broad-based and cuts across the entire political spectrum” (Potter 3). Hence, it is imperative for the United States to work towards reducing the TNW threat. The United States should expand the original objectives of the Nun-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement to include the securing and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, as recommended by experts like William Potter, and developing a new arms control treaty that deals with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (Wurst). Increased US-Russian dialogue on, and transparency regarding, tactical nuclear stockpiles is also imperative for progress. By taking steps such as these, the United States and the Russian Federation can work towards reducing the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons.
-Gregory Proulx
Works Cited
Bunn, Matthew. “The Threat in Russia and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/russia.asp>.
Friedman, Benjamin, comp. “The World’s Nuclear Arsenals.” Center for Defense Information. 24 Sept. 2007 <http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#Russia>.
Millar, Alistair, and Brian Alexander. Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2001. 2-4. 2 Oct. 2007 <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/uncoveredrpt.pdf>.
Potter, Professor William C. Mounting Challenges to Nuclear Nonproliferation. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2004. 3. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://disarmament.un.org/rcpd/Sapporo2004/textweb/potterreport.pdf>.
Ruff, Tilman. Nuclear Terrorism. 2006. 6. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://energyscience.org.au/FS10%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf>.
Wurst, Jim. “U.S.-Russia II: Take Care of Tactical Weapons Next, U.N. Report Urges.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 29 May 2002. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/5/29/7s.html>.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation and the United States have greatly reduced their nuclear stockpiles, owing both to nonproliferation treaties and the decreased threat of nuclear war. However, a serious threat still exists: the overwhelmingly large number of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons left in the Russian arsenal. Tactical nuclear weapons—also known as TNWs—are designed for use in the battlefield to strike targets ranging from carrier groups to enemy ground forces. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR maintained a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons for use in the event of a conflict with NATO, and this arsenal inherited by the Russian Federation is still frightening large, as highlighted by the Center for Defense Information:“Russia is currently estimated to have about 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads plus 3,400 tactical nuclear weapons. It should be noted, however, that estimates of Russia's tactical nuclear arsenal vary widely, ranging upwards to 10,000-15,000 when estimates include weapons waiting dismantlement” (Friedman).
“Because of their often small size and portability, tactical nuclear weapons are more vulnerable than strategic nuclear weapons to accidental or illicit use. Characteristics of command unique to some TNWs—such as predelegated launch authorization, and often inadequate safeguards (i.e., effective permissive action links, or PALs) add to their potential unauthorized, accidental, or illicit use” (Alexander and Millar 4).
The small size of TNWs also makes them extremely vulnerable to theft. This, combined with the fact that many of these weapons sit in poorly secured locations throughout the Russian Federation—which are, in turn, guarded by underpaid and demoralized security forces—make Russian tactical nuclear weapons tempting targets for terrorists, who could acquire them either by theft or bribing corrupt security forces. And this isn’t just a hypothetical threat: senior Russian officials have confirmed that “terrorists have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage facilities” (Bunn).
Tactical nuclear weapons come in several different types—from missile
warheads that would fit into a truck to artillery shells that could fit into something as small as a backpack or suitcase—and have varying degrees of destructive power. Yields range from “relatively low—0.1 kiloton (KT)—to yields higher than those of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—10 to 15 KT, and upwards to 1 megaton” (Alexander and Millar 2). Regardless of this, a terrorist attack on a US city with a stolen Russian tactical nuclear weapon would be devastating. US government analytical tools estimated that the detonation of a 12.5 kiloton bomb—smaller than the Hiroshima bomb—smuggled into New York City would result in 52,000 immediate deaths, expose 238,000 people to direction radiation—causing an additional 10,000 deaths and acute radiation sickness for 44,000 people—and expose 1.5 million people to radioactive fallout in the following days which, in the absence of evacuation or shelter, could kill an additional 200,000 people and cause acute radiation sickness for hundreds of thousands. Another estimate by the US Department of Homeland Security in 2005 predicted that 205,000 fatalities, 295,000 injuries, and 49,000 cancer cases would result from a 10 kiloton explosion in Washington, D.C. (Ruff 6). In addition to the huge number of casualties caused by such an attack, the economic, military, environmental, and political ramifications would be grave and far-reaching.With these dangers posed by Russia’s vast arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in mind, a logical question that would come to mind is, “What is being done to reduce this threat?” Unfortunately, not enough, as “[t]actical nuclear weapons are not covered by any arms control pact, such as the [recent US-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in 2002], nor are they the subject of any negotiations” (Wurst). Even more worrisome is the renewed Russian interest in TNWs—an interest that is “broad-based and cuts across the entire political spectrum” (Potter 3). Hence, it is imperative for the United States to work towards reducing the TNW threat. The United States should expand the original objectives of the Nun-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement to include the securing and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, as recommended by experts like William Potter, and developing a new arms control treaty that deals with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons (Wurst). Increased US-Russian dialogue on, and transparency regarding, tactical nuclear stockpiles is also imperative for progress. By taking steps such as these, the United States and the Russian Federation can work towards reducing the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons.
-Gregory Proulx
Works Cited
Bunn, Matthew. “The Threat in Russia and the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/threat/russia.asp>.
Friedman, Benjamin, comp. “The World’s Nuclear Arsenals.” Center for Defense Information. 24 Sept. 2007 <http://www.cdi.org/issues/nukef&f/database/nukearsenals.cfm#Russia>.
Millar, Alistair, and Brian Alexander. Uncovered Nukes: Arms Control and the Challenge of Tactical Nuclear Weapons. Washington, D.C.: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2001. 2-4. 2 Oct. 2007 <http://www.fourthfreedom.org/pdf/uncoveredrpt.pdf>.
Potter, Professor William C. Mounting Challenges to Nuclear Nonproliferation. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 2004. 3. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://disarmament.un.org/rcpd/Sapporo2004/textweb/potterreport.pdf>.
Ruff, Tilman. Nuclear Terrorism. 2006. 6. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://energyscience.org.au/FS10%20Nuclear%20Terrorism.pdf>.
Wurst, Jim. “U.S.-Russia II: Take Care of Tactical Weapons Next, U.N. Report Urges.” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 29 May 2002. 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/5/29/7s.html>.
Reflection (what week is it anyway?)
This weekend I found an interesting video online. Though it is meant to be entertaining (and it most certainly is), this video reiterates a point made in class earlier this year. Is there really a difference between terrorists and freedom fighters? This topic also fits nicely into tonight's discussion. The United States is currently at war with Iraq. The purpose of this war is supposedly to free the Iraqi people. How is it possible to force someone to be free? We cry foul when the governments of these nations oppress their people, but technically aren't we doing the same thing?
I hope you guys enjoy the video, here is the link: http://youtube.com/watch?v=UQBWGo7pef8
and the lyrics are posted below.
LYRICS:
Well our
Story begins, you know, with old St. Augustine.
Way back in days of old he reported on this theme:
A mighty emperor had caught himself a pirate who
Was a-terrorizin' people who were sailin' on the open seas.
ALEXANDER THE GREAT: What meanest thou by keeping hostile possession of the sea?
PIRATE: What meanest thou by seizing the whole earth; because I do it with a petty ship, I'm called a robber, whilst thou who dost the same with a great fleet art styled emperor.
NARRATOR: And old St. Augustine thought that was a pretty smart answer!
'Cause there are
pirates and emperors, but they're really the same thing
When they go and try to reach the same ends
By using the same means.
Well they do it big
or they do it small
From a little tiny boat,
or from hallowed halls.
Bully is as bully does, that's plain to see.
NARRATOR: Speaking of bullies, what would you say about a gang of vicious, low-down thugs who were trying to overthrow the government by attacking undefended civilian targets like schools, farms, hospitals, & outreach centers?
UNCLE SAM: Why, I'd say they were terrorists!
[BUZZER SOUND and SUPER: "Wrong!"]
NARRATOR: I'm sorry, the correct answer is "Freedom Fighters." At least that's what you called THESE thugs, a.k.a. the Contras, when you funded their campaign of terror and indiscriminate killing to overthrow the government of Nicaragua!
There was trouble in the land of Nicaragua in the '80's, it's true.
And Uncle Sam has always said this kind of thing just really won't do.
So he paid for a bag full of dirty tricks
And turned killers into heroes with a P.R. blitz
Well freedom's sure a funny word for what the Contras did do.
Y'know there are
pirates and emperors but they're really the same thing
Even the ones who say they just wanna let freedom ring.
Well they do it big
or they do it small
But only one goes down when they break the law
While the Big One claims "This really don't apply to me"
NARRATOR: The funny thing about "pirates" and "emperors" is that they often start out as pals who get into a tiff somehow and end up enemies.
KID: You mean like Lex Luthor and Superman!
NARRATOR: Yeah, except Lex Luthor was a nice guy before he lost all his hair, whereas Manuel Noriega, Sadam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden were all known thugs and mass-murderers when they were on Uncle Sam's payroll. That's why they got the job! Either that, or Uncle Sam is just a really bad judge of character.
UNCLE SAM: I don't understand why this keeps happening to me?!
Well not so long ago we thought Saddam here was a pretty swell guy
And we helped him get the goods to make the Ayatollah Khomeini cry
But Uncle Sam decided it was not Saddam's fate
To be the leader of his Middle Eastern client state
That was sitting on top of a big huge oil supply.
Big and little thugs got thuggery in common
Even if one's got stars and stripes on 'im.
Bully is as bully does, that's plain to see.
'Cause if it looks like a duck
And acts like a duck,
And quacks like a duck,
It probably is a duck.
You know a rose is a rose
no matter how much it stinks.
DUCK: I resent that comment.
I'm not a duck, I'm an anti-duck!
I'm a counter-duck!
Well I'm more of a mallard really...
Why, I'm fighting a War on Ducks!
Any ducks come around here, I'm gonna blast 'em!
THE END
© 2004 Eric Henry
I hope you guys enjoy the video, here is the link: http://youtube.com/watch?v
and the lyrics are posted below.
LYRICS:
Well our
Story begins, you know, with old St. Augustine.
Way back in days of old he reported on this theme:
A mighty emperor had caught himself a pirate who
Was a-terrorizin' people who were sailin' on the open seas.
ALEXANDER THE GREAT: What meanest thou by keeping hostile possession of the sea?
PIRATE: What meanest thou by seizing the whole earth; because I do it with a petty ship, I'm called a robber, whilst thou who dost the same with a great fleet art styled emperor.
NARRATOR: And old St. Augustine thought that was a pretty smart answer!
'Cause there are
pirates and emperors, but they're really the same thing
When they go and try to reach the same ends
By using the same means.
Well they do it big
or they do it small
From a little tiny boat,
or from hallowed halls.
Bully is as bully does, that's plain to see.
NARRATOR: Speaking of bullies, what would you say about a gang of vicious, low-down thugs who were trying to overthrow the government by attacking undefended civilian targets like schools, farms, hospitals, & outreach centers?
UNCLE SAM: Why, I'd say they were terrorists!
[BUZZER SOUND and SUPER: "Wrong!"]
NARRATOR: I'm sorry, the correct answer is "Freedom Fighters." At least that's what you called THESE thugs, a.k.a. the Contras, when you funded their campaign of terror and indiscriminate killing to overthrow the government of Nicaragua!
There was trouble in the land of Nicaragua in the '80's, it's true.
And Uncle Sam has always said this kind of thing just really won't do.
So he paid for a bag full of dirty tricks
And turned killers into heroes with a P.R. blitz
Well freedom's sure a funny word for what the Contras did do.
Y'know there are
pirates and emperors but they're really the same thing
Even the ones who say they just wanna let freedom ring.
Well they do it big
or they do it small
But only one goes down when they break the law
While the Big One claims "This really don't apply to me"
NARRATOR: The funny thing about "pirates" and "emperors" is that they often start out as pals who get into a tiff somehow and end up enemies.
KID: You mean like Lex Luthor and Superman!
NARRATOR: Yeah, except Lex Luthor was a nice guy before he lost all his hair, whereas Manuel Noriega, Sadam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden were all known thugs and mass-murderers when they were on Uncle Sam's payroll. That's why they got the job! Either that, or Uncle Sam is just a really bad judge of character.
UNCLE SAM: I don't understand why this keeps happening to me?!
Well not so long ago we thought Saddam here was a pretty swell guy
And we helped him get the goods to make the Ayatollah Khomeini cry
But Uncle Sam decided it was not Saddam's fate
To be the leader of his Middle Eastern client state
That was sitting on top of a big huge oil supply.
Big and little thugs got thuggery in common
Even if one's got stars and stripes on 'im.
Bully is as bully does, that's plain to see.
'Cause if it looks like a duck
And acts like a duck,
And quacks like a duck,
It probably is a duck.
You know a rose is a rose
no matter how much it stinks.
DUCK: I resent that comment.
I'm not a duck, I'm an anti-duck!
I'm a counter-duck!
Well I'm more of a mallard really...
Why, I'm fighting a War on Ducks!
Any ducks come around here, I'm gonna blast 'em!
THE END
© 2004 Eric Henry
Saturday, October 6, 2007
reflection week 6
Friday’s class was a reminder that underneath all of the liberal, realist, and constructivist theories of international relations and the complex global interactions that essentially we are talking about politics in its purest form. When Professor Jackson said that as the President he would go with the position that would contribute the most money to his campaign this particularly hit home. While we might try to avoid the politicking of such situations we all know it occurs.
Friday, I went into the class thinking that each group held the same amount of influence and that if three groups voted one way and two groups the other way that the three groups would win. This was not however the case in the simulation, nor is it the case in the real world of politics. People will look after their own self-interest above all other concerns and the President is no exception. So as hard as the foreign auto manufactures, the Sierra Club, and the consumers tried they would get nowhere with the President because the United Auto Workers and the domestic car manufacturers have a lot more money to donate to the President’s campaign. Sometimes no matter how hard you try you cannot escape the reality of politics. Perhaps that is an overly simplified realist response but I think sometimes it is true and it is important when dealing with such issues the political situations involved. Furthermore these are not just global political phenomenon, they happen in high school student body government elections and even informally among young children at recess. Sometimes there is no getting around politics.
Erica Peterson
Friday, I went into the class thinking that each group held the same amount of influence and that if three groups voted one way and two groups the other way that the three groups would win. This was not however the case in the simulation, nor is it the case in the real world of politics. People will look after their own self-interest above all other concerns and the President is no exception. So as hard as the foreign auto manufactures, the Sierra Club, and the consumers tried they would get nowhere with the President because the United Auto Workers and the domestic car manufacturers have a lot more money to donate to the President’s campaign. Sometimes no matter how hard you try you cannot escape the reality of politics. Perhaps that is an overly simplified realist response but I think sometimes it is true and it is important when dealing with such issues the political situations involved. Furthermore these are not just global political phenomenon, they happen in high school student body government elections and even informally among young children at recess. Sometimes there is no getting around politics.
Erica Peterson
Reflections Week VI
Throughout the last few weeks, we have been learning about three international relations theories that characterize different perceptions and lenses with which to view the world. Interpreting motivations and actions of states through the manner of a Realist, Liberal, or Constructivist obviously yields far different explanations and formulations with which to explain a states behavior, determine its standing in relation to other states, and formulate a plan with which to reach its objectives. Benjamin J. Cohen’s article discussing the Bretton Woods system and the International Monetary Regime spanning the 40’s until the 70’s lent itself well to analysis through the lenses of the three theories. After determining both “Why did the US do it?” and “Why did other countries go along with it?” not only did more distinctions under the umbrella of a certain theory arise, such as Realist Constructivism, but examinations of two of the three theories yielded important information regarding the remaining theory. In short, the exercise clearly defined the understanding of three perspectives of a particular issue as a most crucial tool to better allow one to understand his chosen perspective to the fullest.
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